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I. Background
Minimum unit pricing (MUP) has been available to
policymakers as a public health intervention for sev-
eral decades. However, MUP only appears to have at-
tracted intense scrutiny in recent years, in response
to the (successful) efforts of the ScottishGovernment
toapply it to alcoholicbeverages.1Theheterogeneous
nature of the alcoholic beverages market and the
many and varied types of consumers and consump-
tion patterns for alcoholic beverages2 have made at-
tempts to introduce MUP for alcohol an extremely
controversial topic.3
In comparison, MUP of other products such as to-
bacco, which has been employed far longer in com-
parison andhas generated farmore case law,4has not
attracted the same level of academic or public scruti-
ny that minimum unit pricing of alcohol is now at-
tracting. This may change following the latest judg-
ment on MUP for tobacco that has recently been
handed down by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) in Etablissements Fr. Colruyt.5 The aim
of this contribution is to assess the quality and sig-
nificance of this judgement.
The case was referred to the CJEU for a prelimi-
nary ruling by the Belgian Court of Appeal, in the
course of criminal proceedings against Colruyt, a su-
permarket chain operator, who was alleged to have
breached the 1977Lawon theprotectionof consumer
health in relation to foodstuffs and other goods. Col-
ruyt was found to be selling tobacco products at unit
prices lower than those indicated by themanufactur-
er or importer on the revenue stamp fixed to each to-
bacco product, with quantity and general discounts,
and with discounts to members of a youth move-
ment. In doing so, Colruyt was found by the Belgian
court at first instance to have breached the general
prohibition laid down by the 1977 Law on all com-
munication or acts that are directly or indirectly
aimed at promoting sales of tobacco products.
The Belgian rule, designed to protect consumer
health by, amongst other things, preventing the price
of tobacco products from being used as a marketing
tool, has solid grounding in the available evidence on
promotional pricing of tobacco products. In an era
where stringent control of tobacco products and to-
bacco producers is high on the global agenda,6 and
where considerable legislation has already been in-
troduced to prevent tobacco producers from adver-
tising their products to consumers,7 the retail envi-
ronment is becoming an increasingly crucial frontier
of tobacco control.8 Price promotion at point of sale
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1 For background, see: Srinivasa Katikireddi et al, “Understanding
the Development of Minimum Unit Pricing of Alcohol in Scot-
land: A Qualitative Study of the Policy Process” (2014) 9(3) PLOS
ONE e91185. The legitimacy of the Scottish policy was recently
upheld in The Scotch Whisky Association and Others v Lord
Advocate [2016] CSIH 77.
2 See Peter Anderson and Ben Baumberg, Alcohol in Europe: A
Public Health Perspective (Institute of Alcohol Studies 2006),
p. 75.
3 See for example: Shona Hilton et al, ‘Implications for alcohol
minimum unit pricing advocacy: What can we learn for public
health from UK newsprint coverage of key claim-makers in the
policy debate’ (2014) 102 Social Science and Medicine 157.
4 See for example: Case C-13/7 GB-INNO-BM [1977]
ECLI:EU:C:1977:185, Case C-216/98 Commission v Greece
[2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:571, Case C-197/08 Commission v
France ECLI:EU:C:2010:111.
5 Case C-221/15 Criminal proceedings against Etablissements Fr.
Colruyt NV [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:704.
6 See: WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2008: The
MPOWER package (World Health Organisation 2008). See
also Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (21 May 2003,
entered into force 27 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 166.
7 Directive 2003/33 on the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco
products [2003] OJ L 152, 20.6.2003, p16.
8 Simon Chapman and Becky Freeman, ‘Regulating the tobacco
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has been found to be a prevalent and important tech-
nique for promoting tobacco products,9 in particular
to young people.10 The concern of the Belgian Law
to prevent, in particular, retail pricing strategies be-
ing used as a tool to promote the sale of tobacco prod-
ucts to youth groups, as Colruyt was alleged to have
been doing, is therefore evidentially well founded.11
Colruyt however objected that the 1977 Law pre-
vents, specifically, retailers fromselling tobaccoprod-
ucts at prices lower than those set by the manufac-
turer or importer, and therefore appealed to the Bel-
gian Court of Appeal on three legal grounds. First,
that the Belgian Law is contrary to Article 15(1) of Di-
rective 2011/64 on tobacco excise duty, which pro-
vides that ‘manufacturers … and importers … shall be
free to determine the maximum retail selling price
for each of their products’.12 Second that the Belgian
Law is caught by the prohibition in Article 34 TFEU
onquantitative restrictions on imports andmeasures
having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction.
Third, that the Belgian Law is contrary to Articles
4(3) TEU and 101 TFEU which, when read together,
require Member States to avoid encouraging anti-
competitive practices. The case was referred to the
CJEU, and following the Opinion of Advocate Gener-
al (AG) Wahl in April 2016, the CJEU delivered its
judgment in September.
II. The Opinion of the AG and the
Judgment of the CJEU
The AG and CJEU both deal with the first question
with relative ease. In previous case law on tobacco
MUP, the fixing of minimum prices by government
wasproblematic, sincebynecessityaproducer’smax-
imum price could be no lower than the minimum
price.13However, theminimumunitprice in this case
is fixed at whatever price the producer has deter-
mined. Therefore the AG saw ‘no difficulties’ in hold-
ing that the Belgian Law and Article 15(1) of the Di-
rective did not conflict, because ‘the revenue stamp
price continues to be freely determined by manufac-
turers or importers … therefore the law at issue does
not interfere with the right … to freely set their max-
imum retail price’.14 As the CJEU points out, this sit-
uation falls outside the scope of Article 15(1) entire-
ly.15
Thesecondquestion,however, leads to far less con-
vincing analysis. TheAGand theCJEUboth hold that
the Belgian Law evades capture by Article 34 TFEU
entirely because it is a non-discriminatory selling
arrangement. According to Keck,16 measures do not
hinder intra-Union trade when they apply equally to
all relevant traders and affect all traders in the same
manner in law and in fact.17 However, case law indi-
cates that such measures, if restrictions on product
promotion, can hinder intra-Union trade due to the
extra burden they place on imported products at-
tempting to break onto the market of another Mem-
ber State.18 Given that the economic freedom of re-
tailers is ‘severely reduced’19 by the Belgian Law, that
the second question is asked solely in relation to to-
bacco pricing being used as a promotional tool,20 that
price is an important promotional tool for tobacco
products,21 and the ease with which previous public
health measures have been judged to hinder intra-
Union trade,22 it might be reasonable to suspect that
preventing retailers fromusing price as a promotion-
al toolwould fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU.
9 Dionysis Spanopoulos et al, 'Retail Price and Point of Sale Dis-
play of Tobacco in the UK: A Descriptive Study of Small Retailers'
(2012) 7(1) PLoS ONE e29871.
10 Sandy Slater et al, 'The Impact of Retail Cigarette Marketing
Practices on Youth Smoking Uptake' (2007) 161 Archives of
Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 440.
11 See further support for the evidential effectiveness of minimum
unit pricing in tackling price promotions in Lisa Henriksen,
'Comprehensive tobacco marketing restrictions: promotion,
packaging, price and place' (2012) 21 Tobacco Control 147.
12 Council Directive 2011/64/EU on excise duty applied to manu-
factured tobacco [2012] OJ L 176, 5.7.2011, p. 24.
13 See for example: Case C-197/08 Commission v France
ECLI:EU:C:2010:111, para. 37.
14 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-221/15 Criminal
proceedings against Etablissements Fr. Colruyt NV [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:288, para. 24.
15 supra, note 5, paras. 27 to 29.
16 Case C-267/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECLI:EU:C:1993:905.
17 ibid, para. 16.
18 See for example Case C-34/95 De Agostini [1997]
ECLI:EU:C:1997:334, para. 42; Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001]
ECLI:EU:C:2001:135, para. 21.
19 supra, note 14, para. 36.
20 supra, note 14, para. 49.
21 See Frank Chaloupka et al, 'Tax, price and cigarette smoking:
evidence from the tobacco documents and implications for
tobacco company marketing strategies' (2002) 11(Suppl 1) Tobac-
co Control i62.
22 For instance, see the cases of: C-1/90 Aragonesa [1991]
ECLI:EU:C:1991:327, para. 10; Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:845, para. 32; Case C-405/98 Gourmet
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Instead, both the AG and the Court hold that the
Belgian law does not hinder intra-Union trade. The
AG assumes that the freedom of retailers to set price
is ‘not completely eliminated’ because ‘at least in the-
ory, nothing prevents retailers (especially larger re-
tailers) fromnegotiatingwithmanufacturers and im-
porters … with a view to setting a price for the prod-
ucts lower than that usually practiced’.23 This analy-
sis is troubling though. It is based on a questionable
theoretical assumption - it is not automatic thatman-
ufacturers and retailers will be able to negotiate in
such a predictable way, themarket power balance be-
tween the two being a complex and shifting phenom-
enon.24 Furthermore, this is the second recent exam-
ple of EU judicial institutions basing legal analyses
of MUP measures on questionable assumptions of
business practice. In ScotchWhisky the CJEUwrong-
ly assumed, based on the tobacco context, that taxes
on alcoholic beverages would always be passed on to
the end consumer.25
Conversely, the CJEU ignores altogether the legal
question of whether restrictions on free formation
of retail prices for tobacco hinder intra-Union trade
in the same way as restrictions on tobacco produc-
ers, focussing entirely upon the impact of the mea-
sure on producers. According to the CJEU, the Bel-
gian Law does not affect the ability of importers of
tobacco from other Member States to set prices, and
therefore if all manufacturers or importers, irrespec-
tive of nationality, ‘remain free to set that price’, the
Belgian Law is ‘not of such a kind as to prevent ac-
cess to the Belgian market’.26 In light of the CJEU’s
market access jurisprudence,27 this reasoning is sur-
prising, especially since in GB-INNO-BM a very sim-
ilar Belgian measure gave the Court cause to state
that ‘the possibility cannot be excluded that in cer-
tain cases such a system may be capable of affecting
intra-Community trade’.28 Considering the increas-
ing importance of retail pricing strategy as a market-
ing tool for tobacco, the possibility that market ac-
cess may be hindered by MUP measures that affect
retailers specifically deserved greater attention and
contextualisation.
Onthe thirdquestion, theAGresponded that ‘there
is no basis for concluding that a law such as the one
at issue compels importers, manufacturers or retail-
ers to conclude anti-competitive agreements’.29 Yet,
he bases his response to the second question on the
suggestion that retailers should enter into agree-
ments with producers to fix lower prices if they wish
to sell tobacco at lower prices. The CJEU then claims
that the Belgian Law does not compel producers and
retailers to ‘conclude agreements’.30 The reasoning
adopted on the third question appears confusingly
contradictory, andagaindeservesgreater explanation
than either the CJEU or the AG arewilling to provide.
Bynot entertaining thepossibility that restrictions
on tobacco retailers may be incompatible with inter-
nal market law, the CJEU has lost an opportunity to
examine the proportionality of intervention in the
tobacco retail environment for public health purpos-
es. This is unsatisfactory – while a favourable deci-
sion herewill prima facie benefit public health, a bet-
ter outcome might have been a clearer explanation
of exactly when the imposition of MUP will conflict
with internal market law.
III. Implications
Themain impact of this case is to legitimise the prac-
tice of preventing retailers from discounting tobac-
co products any further than the price set by their
manufacturer or importer, in order to prevent such
discounting being used as a tool to promote the sale
of tobacco. However, is such a mechanism really re-
quired in order to prevent the price of tobacco being
used as a marketing tool? In case it might have es-
capednoticeasa result of the scrutinyplacedonMUP,
the Belgian Law in this case was a general prohibi-
tion on the promotion of tobacco products through
any and all means. Colruyt simply complained that
this prohibitionwould unlawfully encapsulate a pro-
hibitionon theabilityof retailers to freely formprices
23 supra, note 14, para. 56.
24 See for example: Kusum Ailawadi et al, ‘Market power and
performance: A cross-industry analysis of manufacturers and
retailers’ [1995] 71(3) Journal of Retailing 211; C Kuo et al,
‘Pricing Policy in a Supply Chain: Negotiation or Posted Pricing’
(2013) 22(3) Production and Operations Management 626.
25 Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:845,
para. 44. See also: Oliver Bartlett, ‘Minimum Unit Pricing for
Alcohol May Not be a Proportionate Public Health Intervention’
[2016] 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 218.
26 supra, note 5, para. 39.
27 See the case law cited above, in addition to cases which demon-
strate that restrictions post-importation may have an effect on
market access, for example: Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos
[2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:336.
28 GB-INNO-BM, supra note 4, para. 54.
29 supra, note 14, para. 63.
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for tobacco products. Indeed, the majority of EU
Member States already have laws that ban price pro-
motions and promotional discounting for tobacco.31
Member States are also actively encouraged to adopt
such measures by Article 13 of the Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control.32
Thus, thepublichealthobjectives that areachieved
by a tobaccoMUPapplied specifically to retailers that
reflects a price fixed by producers are practically the
same as those sought by general prohibitions on pro-
motional discounting, meaning that the significance
of the ruling in Etablissements Fr. Colruyt for public
health advocacy is arguably low. Perhaps one way in
which this ruling could be seen as helpful is that it
increases legal consistency in how MUP as a tool is
applied to different types of products that are harm-
ful to health. Following the ruling of the CJEU in
Scotch Whisky, and the very recent ruling of the In-
ner House of the Scottish Court of Session, fixing an
MUP for alcohol is compatible with Article 34 TFEU
– the public health objectives sought through apply-
ing a minimum unit price to alcohol cannot be
achieved as effectively by other methods such as in-
creased taxation according the Inner House, and are
appropriate to achieve a legitimateobjective thatmay
justify restrictions on intra-Union trade according to
theCJEU.33Previous toEtablissements Fr. Colruyt, ap-
plying aminimumunit price to tobacco had been un-
lawfulunder thecurrentEUtaxdirectives.AfterEtab-
lissements Fr. Colruyt, it has now at least been estab-
lished that some form of minimum unit pricing may
be applied to both alcohol and tobacco products, thus
increasing the legitimacy of the intervention as a gen-
erally applicable tool of public health protection.
However, if this case is not overly significant in it-
self as a boost to the armory of public health advo-
cates, why then is it worthy of attention? One poten-
tial reason is that Etablissements Fr. Colruyt raises
concerns for public health advocacy of a more gen-
eral nature. The true significance of this case lies in
providing further evidence of the fact that the CJEU
seems unable (or unwilling) to analyse legal issues
relating to the legitimacy ofMUP interventionswith-
in their public health or economic contexts. When
the CJEU assessed MUP for alcoholic beverages in
Scotch Whisky, it was unable to recognise that the
significant distinctions between alcohol and tobacco
as products made the application of jurisprudence
developed in the tobacco context inappropriate in the
alcohol context.34 When the CJEU assessed MUP for
tobacco in the present case, it did not recognise that
the importance of the retail environment as a fron-
tier of tobacco control and the importance of retail
pricing strategies in driving sales of tobacco products
might merit closer legal scrutiny of whether restric-
tions on retail pricing freedom constitute a justified
or unjustified restriction of the free movement of
goods. Given the seemingly extensive and easily en-
gaged scope of Article 34 TFEU where public health
measures are concerned, it seems incongruous that
this particular public health measure should fall
through the net. Certainly, we should not be unhap-
py that the CJEU has upheld the legitimacy of an
MUP measure that contributes to protecting public
health. However wemight still, with good reason, be
concerned that in doing so the CJEU has created a
somewhat opaque ‘exception’ for restrictions on re-
tail pricing strategies for tobacco, an exception that
cannot be fully explained by the fact that the MUP
is effectively being set by tobacco producers rather
than the government. Thus, the real significance of
this case for public health advocacy may lie in con-
firming that the EU judicial institutions have a wor-
ryingly underdeveloped understanding of the con-
text in which specific economic instruments of pub-
lic health protection have been designed to function.
Etablissements Fr. Colruyt stands as a missed op-
portunity for the CJEU to clarify the extent to which
public health objectives justify the restriction of eco-
nomic activity. As stated above, the significance of
this case for public health protection is relatively mi-
nor. However, looking to the bigger picture, if this
missed opportunity really does confirm a trend that
the EU judicial institutions seem unable to analyse
the legality of public health measures within their
public health and economic contexts, what future op-
portunities for clarifying the legal legitimacy of oth-
er economic instruments of public health protection
might be missed? The next one may fall in circum-
stances where the stakes for public health are far
higher.
31 WHO Report on the global tobacco epidemic 2013: Enforcing
bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (World
Health Organization 2013), p. 140.
32 See: Guidelines for the implementation of Article 13 of the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, available online at
http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_13.pdf (last accessed 1
November 2016).
33 Scotch Whisky Association v Lord Advocate, supra, note 1.
34 See Bartlett, supra, note 25.
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